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REAL PROPERTY - GATES ACROSS
RIGHT OF WAY
The question of the right of a servient land owner to erect
gates across a right of way is the primary problem in a recent
Illinois case'. The plaintiff purchased a plot of land together
with a right of way consisting of a 40-foot-wide strip extending
over defendant's land to a public road. There were no gates
at the time of the grant and no right to erect gates was reserved in the grant. Defendant erected a gate across the right
of way and insisted that it be kept closed. Plaintiff removed the
gate insisting that he was entitled to the easement free of gates,
and brought this action to restrain and enjoin the defendant
from further obstructing the right of way.
On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the order of
the trial court granting plaintiff the requested relief. The appellate decision was based on the prior use of the easement without
gates and on the needs of plaintiff for an unrestricted right of
way. The appellate court relied on Rudolph Wurlitzer Company v. State Bank of Chicago' and Kurz v. Blume'. Although
both cases were only indirectly applicable to the present case,
the court's test as to previous usage has considerable merit. It
has been used in a West Virginia case holding that a servient
owner's right to erect fences and gates, although none had existed at the time of the grant, was dependent on the previous
usage and circumstances4 . By previous usage the court does
not mean the previous use of fences and gates but rather the
previous use and circumstances of the land. Changes in surrounding circumstances, as well as in uses of the land, may
create the necessity of erecting gates. The real test here should
1 Schaefer v. Burstine, 13 IU.2d 464, 150 N.E.2d 113 (1958).
2290 Ill.
72, 124 N.E. 844 (1919), here the issue was the right to construct
pillars on a right of way over an alley.
8407 IMI.383, 95 N.X.2d 338, 125 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1950),
rights in question were those gained by adverse possession.

where the

4 Collins v. Degler, 74 W.Va. 455, 82 S.. 265 (1914), in which valuable
farm land was involved and thus gates held essential.

be whether the parties, at the time of the grant, could reasonably
contemplate the possible future need for gates5 .
The cases cited by defendant were properly distinguished
by the court. In Truax v. Gregory', the servient owner was
allowed to maintain gates where they had been in use at the
time of the grant and throughout the existence of the easement. Similarly Leesch v. Krause', held that the servient owner
was entitled to gates where a right of way had been gained by
prescription and the adverse user had allowed gates throughout
the prescriptive period.
The decision, while based in part on the usage at the time
of the grant of the easement, also took into consideration the
relative inconveniences to the parties. In considering the latter
point much weight was placed on the need for convenient and
frequent ingress and egress in our modern age.
The decision holding in effect, that in the absence of agreement or circumstances to the contrary, a right of way should
remain free and unobstructed, is not in accord with common
law. At common law an express grant of a right of way gives
5 Ibid. at 267. The court held that in the grant of a right of way the words
must be given the meaning implied from their use in relation to the
character of the land and the customs appertaining thereto. A distinction was
drawn between an urban right of way where surrounding circumstances and
conditions would not allow gates and a rural right of way where the
character of farm land makes gates essential and a custom of the business.
6 196 Ill. 83, 63 N.E. 674 (1902).
In accord. Bishields v. Campbell, 200
Md. 622, 91 A.2d 922 (1952). However, where gates were not in existence
during the prescriptive period there is a conflict of authority whether they
may be erected by the servient owner. For cases holding that they may
not see: Fankboner v. Corder, 127 Ind. 164, 26 N.E. 766 (1891); Miller
v. Pettit, 127 Ky. 419, 105 S.W. 892 (1907). For the majority view,
holding that they may be erected (reasoning that the particular manner of the
use is not determinative of the nature of the easement), see: Luster v.
Garner, 128 Tenn. 160, 159 S.W. 604 (1913); Mitchell v. Bowman, 74
W.Va. 498, 82 S.E. 330 (1914). There are also authorities holding that
the servient owner may acquire the right to erect gates by prescriptive use
although previously precluded from such rights: Ailes v. Hallam, 69 W.Va.
305, 71 S.E. 273 (1911); Faulkner v. Hook, 300 Mo. 135, 254 S.W. 48
(1923).

7 393 Ill. 124, 65 N.E.2d 370 (1946).
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the servient owner the right to erect gates at termini. Jones On
Easements summarizes the common law:
The rule is general that the landowner may
put gates and bars across a way over his land,
which another is entitled to enjoy, unless of
course, there is something in the instrument
creating the way, or in the circumstances under
which it has been acquired or used, which shows
that the way is to be an open one. The easement
of way is for passage only. The land remains the
property of the owner of the servient estate and
he is entitled to use it for any purpose that does
not interfere with the easement 8 .
This rule has been applied in many cases allowing the servient
owner to erect gates 9.
The court failed to elaborate on one point which would
have given greater strength to their decision. In the instant
case the gate was erected across the right of way at an intermediate point rather than at the termini. This distinction has
been employed in several cases1". In a Kentucky case the common law rule as to gates was specifically negated in connection
with gates at intermediate points:
... the rule does not apply where the consideration for the grant, the object for which it was
made, the situation and condition at the time of
the land, and the manner in which it had been
used and occupied as a passway, demonstrates
that it was not the intention of the parties that
the owner of the servient estate might or should
8 JONES ON EASEMENTS, § 407.
9

Willing v. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 168 S.E. 417 (1933); Davis v. Wilkinson, 140 Va. 672, 125 S.E. 700 (1924); Fortner v. Eldorado Springs Resort Co., 76 Colo. 106, 230 Pac. 386 (1924); Palmer v. Newman, 91 W.Va.
13, 112 S.E. 194 (1922).
20 Evans v. Cook, 33 Ky. 788, 111 S.W. 326 (1908); Bridwell v. Beerman,
190 Ky. 227, 227 S.W. 165 (1921).
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erect any gates across it at a place or places other
than at its termini".
The reason for this rule is that the dominant owner could, at
the time of the grant, reasonably contemplate the erection of
gates at the termini but gates at intermediate points would not
be within the contemplation of the parties. Therefore, to
allow gates at intermediate points would be to impose an inconvenience on the dominant owner while giving the servient
owner a right he had not intended to reserve.
However, in Virginia, a different result would have prevailed despite the distinctions between gates at termini and
intermediate points; distinctions concerning past usage with
or without gates; and distinctions of greater or lesser inconvenience. The erection of gates across easements used for the
purpose of travel is expressly allowed by statute'". A recent
Virginia case' 3 , decided under the Virginia Code, clearly states
that gates are to be allowed and further states that the same result would be reached at common law as is now reached under
Virginia statute. The only conditions imposed by the statute
are that fences must exist on both sides of the right of way,
there must be good faith, and there must be no expressed intent not to have gates" .
The Virginia statute, in accord with common law, precludes Virginia from following the Schaefer case. But, while
the case does not follow the common law rule, it does follow
the reasoning behind the rule. The rule allowed the servient
owner to erect gates because it was believed more necessary to
11Raisor v. Lyons, 172 Ky. 315, 189 S.W. 234 (1916); it should be noted

that, in addition to cases decided on the point, other decisions on gates
specify only that they are to be allowed at the termini without ruling on
intermediate points.

12 Va. Code, § 33-119 (1950).

Is Hartsock v. Powell, 199 Va. 320, 99 S.E.2d 581 (1957). In accord: Good
v. Petticrew, 165 Va. 256, 183 SE. 217 (1936); Terry v. Tinsley, 140 Va.
240, 124 SE. 290 (1924); Meadows v. Meadows, 143 Va. 98, 129 SE.
354 (1925).
14

A 1952 amendment to the statute adds the proviso that the landowner
must own land on each side of the right of way.

allow land to be enclosed than to allow the dominant owner
unrestricted travel over the right of way' 5 . The court in the
instant case has found this comparison of need to be in favor
of the dominant owner. Although this may have resulted in
justice in the Schaefer case, such reasoning, if followed, would
add confusion and uncertainty to the law. The Virginia statute
conveniently does away with the necessity for the reasoning
involved in the Schaefer case by providing a clear if arbitrary
standard which in effect codifies the common law. It is submitted that other jurisdictions may avoid uncertainty and clarify
right of way law by enacting similar statutes.
N.W.S.
15 Fortner v. Eldorado Springs Resort Co., supra at 391. See also 3 Tiffany,
REAL PROPERTY, 812, 3rd Ed. (1939). And see RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, § 48, in which emphasis is placed on the reason for the rule
and which would tend to corroborate the reasoning of the court in the
instant case.
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